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Three Sheets to the Wind:  
The Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit, 
Congressional Political Posturing, and an 
 Unsustainable Energy Policy 
CHRISTOPHER RITI* 
INTRODUCTION 
A.  The Global Backdrop 
America, together with the larger global community, is facing 
an unprecedented energy crisis.1  The United States (U.S.) is 
undeniably addicted to inefficient, environmentally deleterious 
energy sources like coal and petroleum.  This slavish addiction is 
characterized not only by a self-destructive relationship with the 
natural environment but by its palpable threat to national 
security and economic vitality.  While the U.S. comprises only a 
small percentage of the world’s population (4.6%), the country 
 
* Christopher Riti is the Graduate Research Fellow for the Center for 
Environmental Legal Studies at Pace University School of Law. He is currently 
pursuing an LL.M. degree in climate change law from Pace, having received his 
B.A. from Yale University and J.D. from Pace, specializing in energy and 
climate change law. He served for three years as a Research Associate with the 
Pace Energy and Climate Center, and as a delegate energy advisor to the 
Permanent Mission of Grenada at the U.N. 
1. International Energy Agency, Energy Technology Perspectives 2008, 
Tokyo Launch (June 6, 2008), available at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/ 
techno/etp/ETP_2008.pdf (requiring $45 trillion dollars in investments). 
Mohamed ElBaradei, Dir. Gen., Int’l Atomic Energy Agency, Address at the 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting 2008: Addressing the Global Energy 
Crisis (Oct. 6-8 2008), http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2008/cfm 
061008.pdf. See also James Kanter, International Agency Urges the Start of an 
‘Energy Revolution’, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2008; Vivienne Walt, Why the Energy 
Crisis Will Outlast the Credit Crisis, TIME, Nov. 15, 2008, http://www.time.com/ 
time/business/article/0,8599,1859236,00.html. 
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consumes more than one quarter of all global petroleum 
products.2  To sate this considerable appetite, the U.S. must 
import over 60% of its oil from international sources, over and 
above whatever is produced domestically.3  The result is a country 
left unsettlingly vulnerable to political posturing, price volatility, 
and technological instability.4  Further, these imports contribute 
substantially to America’s ballooning trade deficit, devaluing the 
dollar in a frighteningly stagnant economy.5  Multinational fossil 
fuel companies with clearly vested interests—working together 
with broken domestic automakers (firms that until recently have 
had no motivation to develop scalable, fuel-efficient vehicles)—are 
blatantly compromising the country’s energy future.  In addition, 
coal—responsible for almost half of the power generated in the 
U.S.6—is one of the more inefficient and polluting fuel sources, 
from its destructive extraction to its large-scale burning.7 
 
 2. See The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/rankorder/2174rank.html (last visited Aug.. 15, 2010); Energy 
Information Administration, U.S. Petroleum Supply, Consumption, and 
Inventories (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/ 
4atab.pdf; Energy Information Administration, World Petroleum Consumption 
(Aug. 2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/3dtab.pdf. Safe, 
Strong and Secure: Reducing America’s Oil Dependence, http://www.nrdc.org/ 
air/transportation/ aoilpolicy2.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2010). 
 3. The Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, 
http://globalwarming.house.gov/issues/energyindependence?id=0002 (last visited 
Aug.  15, 2010) [hereinafter The Select Committee]. 
 4. Safe, Strong and Secure: Reducing America’s Oil Dependence, 
http://www.nrdc.org/air/transportation/aoilpolicy2.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 
2010); The Select Committee, supra note 3. See also IND. TASK FORCE #58, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. OIL 
DEPENDENCY (2006), available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attach 
ments/EnergyTFR.pdf (also notes that “often, [oil] revenues accrue to a small 
minority that is unaccountable to any representative political authority, which 
not only undermines governance, but also risks the political stability that is 
essential to reliable production of oil and gas.”); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY TASK FORCE ON ENERGY, ENERGY SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A 
NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY (2006), available at http://www.americanprogress. 
org/kf/ energy_security_report.pdf. 
 5. See The Select Committee, supra note 3. 
6. Electric Power Monthly, EIA.DOE.GOV, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/ 
electricity/epm/epm_sum.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2010). 
 7. NYSERDA, ENERGY ANALYSIS PROGRAM, COAL RESOURCE ASSESSMENT 
2006, available at http://www.nyserda.org/sep/sepsection3-7.pdf. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/7
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Besides the obvious strategic disadvantages associated with 
enslavement to fossil fuels, the costs to human health and the 
environment are enormous.  Air pollution—greenhouse gases, 
particulates, smog, and toxins—is intrinsic to this process and 
represents a discernible threat to populations located not only 
within the expansive vicinities of these generating plants, but 
across the planet.8  Water pollution, in the form of widespread 
contamination of drinking water supplies, directly affects millions 
across the nation.9  Mercury, arsenic, and other highly toxic 
chemicals natural to coal tailings threaten sensitive waters at 
every stage of power processing.10 
Many policymakers are cogently beginning to acknowledge 
the overwhelming contribution to global climate change by the 
burning of fossil fuels.11  Scientific, nonpartisan studies continue 
to indicate, in an ever more forceful way, that climatological 
changes causing droughts, famines, and altered weather patterns 
are closely linked to anthropogenic activity.12  Potent greenhouse 
gases—the result of unsustainable methods of power production, 
agriculture, development, and transportation—are building up 
within the atmosphere at unprecedented rates and pressure-
cooking the earth by trapping the sun’s rays and radiation.13  
These atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations have 
finally exceeded the Earth’s absorptive capacity, resulting in an 
average increase in the surface temperature of the Earth and its 
 
 8. NYSERDA, supra note 7; UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, 
ATMOSPHERIC BROWN CLOUDS: REGIONAL ASSESSMENT REPORT WITH FOCUS ON 
ASIA (2008), http://www.unep.org/pdf/ABCSummaryFinal.pdf. 
 9. See, e.g., Water Quality Issues of Electricity Production: Pollution of 
Water Bodies, http://www.powerscorecard.org/issue_detail.cfm?issue_id=6 (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2010). 
 10. See, e.g., Environmental Impacts of Coal Power: Air Pollution, 
http://www.ucsusa.com/clean_energy/coalvswind/c02c.html (last visited Aug 14, 
2010) (noting that “[I]In an average year, a typical coal plant generates . . . 225 
pounds of arsenic, which will cause cancer in one out of 100 people who drink 
water containing 50 parts per billion”); ScienceDaily, Higher Levels of 
Pollutants Found in Fish Caught Near a Coal-fired Power Plant, SCIENCEDAILY, 
Nov. 8, 2007, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/11/071107083907.htm; 
LARRY THOMAS, COAL GEOLOGY 292-93 (2002). 
 11. IPCC, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, IN CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 2-3, 13 (2007). 
 12. See id. 
 13. Id. 
3
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oceans over a protracted period of time.14  As the temperature 
rises, “changes in precipitation patterns, storm severity, and sea 
level”—in addition to widespread ocean acidification and land 
desertification—will only continue to worsen, pushing once 
diverse ecosystems to the brink of collapse and fundamentally 
altering the human community.15 
Add to this ecological quandary a crumbling national 
infrastructure, a severely recessed economy, and a constantly 
burgeoning population marked by a ravenous consumer culture. 
As such, the need to develop alternative and renewable sources of 
energy has never been more pressing or explicit.  Technological 
capabilities are hardly the limiting factor in this equation.  
Indeed, solar panels, wind turbines, geothermal piping, and fuel 
cells are all viable, clean sources of potential fuel that can form a 
large part of a comprehensive, sustainable energy solution.16  
Rather, the biggest obstacle facing realization of this massive 
potential17 concerns the initial capital costs of implementing these 
technologies on a large-scale basis—on the levels sufficient to 
produce enough clean electricity to offset and eventually replace 
that which is produced by conventional internal combustion at 
 
 14. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, GREENHOUSE GASES, CLIMATE 
CHANGE, AND ENERGY 1 (2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ 
ggccebro/chapter1.html. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., U.S. DOE, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, 20% Wind 
Energy by 2030: Increasing Wind Energy’s Contribution to U.S. Electric Supply, 
July 2008. See also Mesa Power Places World’s Largest Single-Site Wind 
Turbine Purchase Order, ENERGY & ECOLOGY, May 26, 2008 (T. Boone Pickens, 
expressing his hope that Congress will enact a long-term extension of the 
Production Tax Credit, noted that with there is no decline curve with 
renewables, as opposed to traditional fossil fuel sources, where once the well or 
mine is exhausted, another site is needed). 
 17. Clean Energy: From the Margins to the Mainstream: Hearings of the S. 
Finance Comm., 109th Cong. (2007) (statement of Ryan Wiser, Scientist, 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory) (opining that while European 
countries with “aggressive, longer-term policy commitments” are generating 
anywhere from 10-20% of their electricity from wind, the U.S., “despite having a 
much more robust resource, currently meets less than 1 percent of its electricity 
needs with wind.”). See also U.S. Senator Pete V. Domenici (R-NM) Holds a 
Hearing on the Implementation of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, FDCH 
POLITICAL TRANSCRIPTS, July 11, 2006 (PTC will enable the “full development of 
the 5,600-megawatt capacity that is considered available in the western United 
States over the next decade.”). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/7
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power plants.18  These costs can range into the hundreds of 
millions of dollars, and have generally been inaccessible to all but 
the largest corporate entities with disposable capital.19  Achieving 
scalability continues to be the intransigent problem that impedes 
investment and widespread implementation.  This lack of 
investment is in turn preventing scalability, thus perpetuating a 
stalling cycle within the industry.  Renewables are unable to gain 
a foothold within the national infrastructure, as investors are 
hesitant to invest resources in projects that they are not certain 
will produce any viable returns over the 10-15 year short-term 
future.20  Moreover, the volatility of world oil prices undercuts the 
ability of more efficient alternatives to gain a foothold in the 
marketplace.21  As long as oil prices are low, at least as compared 
to investments in new technologies, there is no incentive to make 
power companies realize these clean opportunities for 
redevelopment.  And with no incentive, there is no action. 
 B.  Shifting the Balance Through Incentives 
For the better part of a quarter century, policymakers and 
developers have been working on various incentivizing measures 
and mechanisms that will remove the institutional and financial 
impediments to clean energy investment.22  The merits or 
disadvantages of these technologies will not be addressed here; 
rather, this comment will focus on one of the more productive 
mechanisms for stimulating and encouraging investment, the 
Federal Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit. First 
 
 18. See, e.g., Dave Newman, Empowering the Wind: Overcoming Obstacles to 
Wind Energy Development in the United States, 3 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 
5 (2003). 
 19. Denis Hayes, Solar and Wind Power Held Hostage—Again, YALE ENV’T 
360, http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2060. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Clifford Krauss, Alternative Energy Suddenly Faces Headwinds, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008 at B1 (noting the disincentives for renewables investment 
associated with falling oil prices, the author recalls a similar situation in the 
1980s, “when a decade of advances for alternative energy collapsed amid falling 
prices for conventional fuels.”). 
 22. See James W. Moeller, Of Credits and Quotas: Federal Tax Incentives for 
Renewable Resources, State Renewable Portfolio Standards, and the Evolution 
of Proposals for a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. 
REV. 69 (2004). 
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instituted in the 1992 Energy Policy Act,23 this Production Tax 
Credit (PTC) was introduced to help foster the transition to 
renewable energy production by offsetting the much higher costs 
of such energy.  Theoretically, these tax credits would help to 
both subsidize a nascent industry dependent upon government 
sponsorship, narrowing the cost gap between renewables and 
traditional power generation and working to defray the costs of 
initial capital investment by subsidizing the utilities’ levelized 
costs.24  For a taxpayer with positive tax liability, the PTC serves 
as the functional equivalent of a government subsidy by reducing 
the taxpayer’s liabilities for several years through marginal cost 
reduction.25  In this way, investors were more willing to commit 
on a long-term basis to sustainable wind-farms, solar panels, and 
other forms of renewable energy as revenue streams would 
remain consistently competitive with traditional fuel sources.26 
However, the Production Tax Credit, practically from the 
moment of its implementation, has provoked a veritable hornet’s 
nest of intense and protracted political controversy.  Its long-term 
viability has been held hostage by the fickle partisan squabbling 
that has plagued Congress since its own inception.  Caught 
between powerful industries and political disputes, the PTC is 
consistently unable to achieve its maximum potential in terms of 
spurring growth rates for renewable development. The legislative 
 
 23. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in 
scatted sections of 11, 15, 16, 25, 26, 30 & 42 U.S.C.). 
 24. BRANDON OWENS, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, NREL/TP-
620-31969, AN ECONOMIC VALUATION OF A GEOTHERMAL PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT 
2 (2002). See also JOEL DARMSTATDER, RESOURCE FOR THE FUTURE, THE 
ECONOMIC AND  OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 4-5 (2003)   
At its core, the decision of how to expand electricity-generating capacity 
rests on the comparative marginal costs of renewable versus 
conventional systems . . . [E]ven apart from future trends in fuel costs, it 
stands to reason that technological improvements in power production 
will apply not just to renewables but to their nonrenewable competitors 
as well, thus hampering renewables’ success in gaining market share. 
 
Id. “Levelized cost” is the marginal cost of electricity production over the life of 
the facility, including all capital expenditures, equity and fuel costs, and 
operating costs. 
 25. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING 
TO TAX CREDITS FOR ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION FROM RENEWABLE SOURCES 8-12 
(2005). 
 26. See, e.g., id. at iii. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/7
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failure to extend the PTC has come at a terrible price—failure to 
initiate strong wind and solar development has lead to continued 
environmental degradation and a sagging economic and national 
infrastructure, one that is dependent upon an outdated and 
ultimately unreliable form of power generation.  Moreover, the 
uncertainty of the provision from year to year has created a 
“boom-and-bust” cycle of investment.27  Until the PTC—or a 
useful equivalent—can be formally extended for more than a 
limited period, it will continue to fall short of incentivizing 
renewable development at an environmentally and economically 
acceptable rate.  With an administration seemingly dedicated to 
energy infrastructure redevelopment, clean energy alternatives, 
and a strong understanding of the fundamentals of economic 
stimulation, there is hope yet that the PTC will come to achieve 
its stated goal.28 
 C.  Overview 
This comment purports to examine the troubled history of 
the Production Tax Credit, in the hopes of isolating some of the 
more contentious reasons for its stunted progress and suggesting 
ways by which Congress might arrive at a more lasting 
compromise.  Moreover, there are distinct policy options available 
to the current presidential administration—through a 
combination of carbon cap legislation, an Infrastructure Bank, 
and the repeal of fossil fuel subsidies—that can deliver upon the 
unrealized promise of renewable energy.  This analysis will segue 
into a broad review of the Energy Security and Independence Act 
of 2007, which marked an unsuccessful bid to extend the PTC for 
several more years.  This review will serve as an illuminating 
microcosm of the larger partisan battle at the center of which lies 
 
 27. See, e.g., RYAN WISER, MARK BOLINGER & GALEN BARBOSE, USING THE 
FEDERAL PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT TO BUILD A DURABLE MARKET FOR WIND POWER 
IN THE UNITED STATES (2007); Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with 
Energy-Based Tax Incentives: The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for 
Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43 (2006); VICKI ARROYO, GLOBAL 
WARMING: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW  (2007). 
 28. Kate Galbraith, Obama Vows Support for Renewables—and a Carbon 
Cap, Green A Blog About Energy & the Environment, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/obama-vows-support-for-renewables-
and-a-carbon-cap/  (Feb. 25, 2009, 6:57 AM) 
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the politically threatening PTC.  Finally, this paper will survey 
more recent legislation—specifically with regard to the financial 
bailout and stimulus packages—to see exactly where the PTC’s 
future prospects are hidden.  The paper will culminate with policy 
recommendations that might serve as a rudimentary framework 
for future negotiations between the relevant parties. Ultimately, 
the fight over the PTC is but a fringe skirmish in a much larger 
war over the systemic viability of our government and our 
natural world.  The unsustainable path that we have beaten since 
the Industrial Revolution offers only a bleak, strained future 
bereft of biodiversity.  It is the hope of this author that by 
drawing attention to this critical legislation and its implications, 
that future may be altered. 
I. HISTORY OF THE PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT 
 A.  Inception: The Energy Policy Act of 1992 
In an effort to spur consistent renewable energy 
infrastructure development and generation, Congress created the 
Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit within the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992.29  The Act provided for an inflation-adjusted 
1.5 cent per kilowatt hour (kWh) tax credit for electricity 
produced from wind and closed-loop biomass resources and sold to 
an unrelated third party during the taxable year in question.30  
Qualifying energy developments were eligible to receive the tax 
credit for 10 years following startup.  Almost immediately, this 
tax credit had a profound impact on stimulating economic growth 
and heavy investment in renewable energy technology and 
installation.31  The credit has since been expanded to include 
municipal solid waste, qualified hydropower, biomass, and 
 
 29. Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1914(a), 106 Stat. 2776, 3020 (codified at 26 
U.S.C. § 45(c) (1992)). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Green Job Growth and Global Warming: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Bill Unger, 
Partner Emeritus, Mayfield Fund); Emily Kennedy, Federal Regulations, 
Incentives, and Funding of Renewable Energy in 2006, 1 ENVT’L & ENERGY L. & 
POL’Y J. 403 (2007); Newman, supra note 18, at 5 ; Moeller, supra note 22, at 69. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/7
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geothermal facilities, among others.32  The PTC was codified in 
Section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code.33 
The PTC has been extended at various points in subsequent 
years; however, inconsistent extension has led to a staggered 
investment pattern that has impaired the ability of the renewable 
energy industry to effectively entrench itself within the larger 
national energy infrastructure.34  One of the more recent 
iterations of the PTC has been the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EP 
Act), which codified an extension through the year 2008.35  This 
congressional decision met with strong opposition mainly from 
interest-backed Republican congressmen who took issue almost 
exclusively with the proposed form of offsetting funds for the 
credits themselves, i.e. the proposed repeal of oil and natural gas 
subsidies.36 
 B.  Transition: Energy Policy Act of 2005 and Other 
Federal Considerations 
While the 2005 EP Act did extend the PTC, it also provided 
for a handout of billions of dollars in subsidies for the fully 
matured and exorbitantly wealthy oil and natural gas 
industries.37  This was presumably to equalize the government 
treatment of the fossil fuel-based and renewable energy 
industries.  However, these subsidies, whatever their superficial 
justification, are effectively sweetheart deals meant to pacify a 
recalcitrant industry sector bent on frustrating widespread 
renewable and alternative energy institutionalization.  The 
reasons are obvious—renewable energy generation, which is 
clean, consistent, and idealistically cost-effective, is a direct 
threat to the oil and natural gas industries’ future viability.  In 
 
 32. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, 111th 
Cong. (2009). The credit, as of the date of this article, currently stands at about 
2.1 cents per kilowatt hour generated. 
 33. I.R.C. § 45 (2006); see Form 8835, Renewable Electricity, Refined Coal, 
and Indian Coal Production Credit, 2008. 
 34. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 § 507, Pub. 
L. 106-170 (2006); Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act § 603, Pub. L. 107-
147 (2006); The Working Families Tax Relief Act § 313, Pub. L. 108-311 (2006). 
 35. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). 
 36. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 80, at 6676-77. 
 37. Energy Policy Act of 2005, §§ 342-43. 
9
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effect, every kilowatt of clean energy generated by a renewable 
project and subsidized by the federal government is construed as 
an affront to fossil fuels in general.  To counteract this perceived 
favoritism, congressional leaders felt it was better to assuage the 
oil and natural gas sectors with billion-dollar handouts than to 
work with the industries to create an equitable policy standard— 
one that would protect their present interests while not 
sacrificing future stability of human health and the environment.  
At any rate, these subsidies have continued to upset the balance 
of progress in favor of renewable investment by handcuffing 
future Congresses and weakening their ability to extend the PTC, 
and have led to further environmental ruin.38  The PTC was again 
extended in the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006.39 
Congress has also frequently contemplated other 
mechanisms or policies that would work in conjunction with the 
Production Tax Credit to incentivize renewable energy 
generation.  One of the most direct ways in which to do this would 
be to enact a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS).40  An 
RPS would effectuate a federal mandate to energy utilities to 
purchase a specified amount of their electricity from renewable 
generators.41  Combined with a PTC that defrays not only 
operating but initial capital costs, the federal RPS would create 
and guarantee a vibrant market for renewable energy.42  
 
 38. See, e.g., Roberta Mann, Symposium: The Business of Climate Change: 
Challenges and Opportunities for Multinational Business Enterprises: Another 
Day Older and Deeper in Debt: How Tax Incentives Encourage Burning Coal 
and the Consequences for Global Warming, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & 
DEV. L. J. 111 (2007). 
 39. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, § 201, Pub. L. 109-432 
 40. Barry Rabe, In this Issue: Sustainable Energy: Race to the Top: The 
Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 7 SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. L. & POL’Y 10 (2007); Joel B. Eisen, The Environmental Responsibility of 
the Regionalizing Electric Utility Industry, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 295 
(2005); Mary Ann Ralls, Congress Got It Right: There’s No Need to Mandate 
Renewable Portfolio Standards, 27 ENERGY L. J. 451 (2006). 
 41. Sen. Bingaman: Encouraging Renewable Energy Investment, U.S. FED. 
NEWS, May 5, 2004 (“[a]ccording to an EIA analysis of a 10 percent RPS, it 
would quadruple the amount of electricity produced from wind energy”). 
 42. See generally KAREN PALMER & DALLAS BURTRAW, RESOURCES FOR THE 
FUTURE, ELECTRICITY, RENEWABLES, AND CLIMATE CHANGE: SEARCHING FOR A 
COST-EFFECTIVE POLICY (2004). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/7
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Together, investment is made much more attractive, as market 
demand begins to outweigh costs associated with the enterprise.43 
 C.  Stimulation: Effect of the Production Tax Credit 
To date, the Production Tax Credit has stimulated renewable 
energy investment to unforeseen levels.44  Particularly indicative 
of this industry activity is the wind sector, which has posted 36% 
(2003), 43% (2005), and 27% (2006) increases in MW capacity 
installed in each of the years in which the PTC has been firmly in 
place.45  Even in spite of its difficulties, its impact on the 
renewable energy industry has been truly encouraging and has 
helped to lay the groundwork for a stronger renewable energy 
infrastructure.46  Due in part to the effects of the PTC, the U.S. 
“led the world in newly installed wind power capacity” for the 
years 2005 and 2006, investing nearly $4 billion since 1994.47 
Making renewable energy cost competitive is the 
quintessential function of the PTC, and thus far it has not failed 
in its endeavor.  After factoring in inflation-adjusted credits, 
wind-generated electricity can cost as little as 6 cents per 
kilowatt hour, as compared to the 3 to 5 cents for coal-fired 
electricity.48  That price gap is far more palatable when the PTC 
is in play.  In one study, a ten year enactment of the PTC, at 1.8 
cent per kWh (inflation-adjusted), was estimated to reduce the 
levelized cost of electricity for geothermal facilities by 25%, 
 
 43. Robert J. Michaels, National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Smart Policy 
or Misguided Gesture?, 29 ENERGY L. J. 79 (2008); WOOD MACKENZIE, AMERICAN 
WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION, THE IMPACT OF A FEDERAL RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO 
STANDARD (2007). 
 44. See, e.g., John Herrick, Federal Project Financing Incentives for Green 
Industries: Renewable Energy and Beyond, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 77, 109 
(2003). 
 45. Union of Concerned Scientists, Production Tax Credit for Renewable 
Energy, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/solutions/big_picture_solutions/ 
production-tax-credit-for.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2010). 
 46. Brad Sherman, A Time to Act Anew: A Historical Perspective on the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the Changing Electrical Energy Market,  13 WM. 
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 211 (2006). 
 47. RYAN WISER, MARK BOLINGER & GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELEY 
NATIONAL LABORATORY, USING THE FEDERAL PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT TO BUILD A 
DURABLE MARKET FOR WIND POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2007). 
 48. Power Source, CFO MAGAZINE, July 2006. 
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enough to bring it within the range of competition with 
conventional fossil fuel-based power generation.49  In another 
study of only wind and closed-loop biomass development, an 
extension of the PTC until 2020 results in renewables accounting 
for 11.5% of total electricity generation in the U.S.50  Future 
forecasts for wind development vary significantly according to the 
source.51 
“Unfortunately in this instance, two plus one plus one does 
not necessarily equal five predictable years . . . Business thrives 
on the known and fails on the unknown.  The unpredictable 
nature of the credit has prevented the needed investment in 
U.S.—based facilities that will drive the economies of scale and 
efficiencies.”52  Perhaps the most illuminating indicator of its 
importance comes when the credit has actually been unavailable 
due to expiration.53  The unpredictability and uncertainty of an 
extension before any expiration year has had a profoundly 
detrimental effect on widespread investment.54  When investors 
cannot be sure of the quality of their investment—in the form of 
expected return (which includes savings from tax credits)—
healthy investment will be chilled.  This has precisely been the 
case, as renewables investment has fallen off precipitously for 
each year in which the PTC has expired and has significantly 
cooled for those years where its fate was undecided and 
 
 49. BRANDON OWENS, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, AN 
ECONOMIC VALUATION OF A GEOTHERMAL PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT at iii (2002). 
See also Alternative-energy tax credits still up in air, THE NEWS JOURNAL 
(WILMINGTON, DELAWARE), June 1, 2008 (discussing how a “tax credit brings 
down a developer’s costs by roughly 30 percent”). 
 50. PALMER & BURTRAW, supra note 42, at 38. 
 51. See IEA World Energy Outlook; RUDOLF RECHSTEINER, 
ENERGYWATCHGROUP, WIND POWER IN CONTEXT: A CLEAN REVOLUTION IN THE 
ENERGY SECTOR (2008), available at http://www.energywatchgroup.org/ 
fileadmin/global/pdf/2009-01_Wind_Power_Report.pdf. 
 52. Clean Energy: From the Margins to the Mainstream: Hearings of the S. 
Finance Comm., 109th Cong. (2007) (statement of Dean Gosselin, V.P. of Bus. 
Dev. for Wind Power, FPL Energy). 
 53. See Utilities Plan on Renewables, Even Without Mandate, INSIDE ENERGY 
WITH FEDERAL LANDS, Aug. 15, 2005 (describing the critical importance of 
planning horizons for utilities in recouping costs). 
 54. AARON SEVERN, ET AL., AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION, WIND 
ENERGY PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT (PTC) (2008). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/7
  
2010] THREE SHEETS TO THE WIND 795 
uncertain.55  For example, in the years the PTC has been allowed 
to lapse, investment in wind-based infrastructure has fallen 73-
93% in the following years.56  This clear trend validates the sense 
of urgency surrounding the future of the PTC and the renewable 
energy industry itself. 
There are numerous other negative consequences associated 
with a lapse of the PTC.  First, institutional interest in financing 
large capital projects begins to dissipate several months before 
the lapse, which compounds the already-tenuous state of most 
renewable projects.57  Increased generating capacity is the key to 
developing successful market penetration.58  Without the PTC 
investors are not willing to commit resources to such a risky 
project, especially in the present economic climate, when venture 
capital is all too elusive.59  The next issue relates to the delayed 
extension of the tax credit.  According to the American Wind 
Energy Association, a “rush to complete projects before the 
deadline creates a herd effect.  Developers and sponsors dash to 
stick pylons in the ground, spiking turbine prices.”60  This “herd 
effect” counterproductively works against the intended effect of 
the PTC, as it unnecessarily drives up already-high prices.  As a 
result, investors lose the incentive to devote capital to projects if 
they have to pay above-market rates.  This messy situation does 
not in any way facilitate the PTC’s potential to leverage private 
 
 55. See id. 
 56. AWEA.com, AWEA Legislative Priorities, http://www.awea.org/ 
legislative/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2010). 
 57. See Key Challenges Remain for Developing and Deploying Advanced 
Energy Technologies to Meet Future Needs, GAO REPORTS, Dec. 20, 2006. 
 58. Renewable Energy and Clean Air Compliance; Green Convergence, EPA 
CLEAN AIR INTERSTATE RULES MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY, June 22, 2005 (“over 
time, learning rates and experience will improve the economics of [renewables, 
as] the costs of generation decline with increasing cumulative capacity in the 
market”). 
 59. Clean Energy: From the Margins to the Mainstream: Hearings of the S. 
Finance Comm., 109th Cong. (2007) (statement of Todd Raba, Pres., 
MidAmerican Energy Company) (speaking about the effect of the PTC lapse on 
his wind development, “we couldn’t risk final acquisition and installation of the 
turbines without the PTC being restored, as the project would not have met the 
cost requirements of the Iowa Utilities Board.” Energy law, as it relates to 
utility regulation, often affects decisions closely linked to the PTC). 
 60. Renewables: Challenges Ahead for the U.S. Wind Industry, MODERN 
POWER SYSTEM, Sept. 13, 2005. 
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cost funding.  Furthermore, allowing the credit to lapse threatens 
the economic stability of the ambient investment zones.61  The 
credit is closely linked to the economic fortunes of those 
communities most in need of stimulation. 
 D.  Costs of the Production Tax Credit 
Since the program’s inception in 1992, the cost of PTC claims 
for the federal government have been estimated at more than 
$2.7 billion.62  While this figure seems large in an absolute sense, 
comparatively it is quite paltry—consider that in 2006 alone, the 
government offered fiscal subsidies to the fossil fuel, nuclear, and 
ethanol industries at a cost of over $64 billion.63  Any proposals 
for its extension inevitably, and appropriately, consider the costs 
of such an endeavor.  Studies have also shown that “from the 
perspective of the U.S. Treasury, it is likely that the net cost of 
the PTC would be insignificant or perhaps even negative.”64  This 
conclusion is a result of the higher tax liabilities often associated 
with renewable energy projects, as compared to an average fossil 
fuel-based power plant.65  Furthermore, it is foreseeable that 
there will be less and less of a need for the PTC once the 
renewable energy industry has successfully established its 
foothold in the market.  This has been the result of most other 
 
 61. See, e.g., Rep. Pomeroy Calls on Administration to Support Wind Energy 
Investments, U.S. FED. NEWS, Feb. 13, 2008 (noting that the “last time the 
credit expired at the end of 2003 over 2,000 jobs were lost and 1,500 megawatts 
of new wind energy production and nearly $2 billion in economic activity were 
put on hold” just in North Dakota alone); Mary O’Discoll, Wind Power: Congress 
Sends Tax Cut Bill with Renewable Provision to President, GREENWIRE, Sept. 
24, 2008 (2,000 MW of suspended new windpower development “translates into 
$2 billion in economic activity” and over 2,000 jobs). 
 62. RYAN WISER, MARK BOLINGER & GALEN BARBOSE, USING THE FEDERAL 
PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT TO BUILD A DURABLE MARKET FOR WIND POWER IN THE 
UNITED STATES 13 (2007). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See generally BRANDON OWENS, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY 
LABORATORY, AN ECONOMIC VALUATION OF A GEOTHERMAL PRODUCTION TAX 
CREDIT (2002). 
 65. Id. (“In fact, a recent analysis of geothermal federal royalties and income 
taxes found that federal taxation on geothermal power is about three to four 
times that of electricity produced from a new natural-gas combined-cycle power 
plant.”) (citations omitted.). 
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government subsidies, where cost curves shift downwards as 
technologies achieve economies of scale.66  Contrastingly, some 
studies have indicated that the PTC essentially pays for itself, if 
not producing a net positive for the Treasury.67 
II.  ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY ACT 
OF 2007, THE ECONOMIC RECESSION, AND 
RECENT LEGISLATION 
More than ten years after its creation, the Production Tax 
Credit had certainly accomplished its main objective of 
stimulating new renewable energy development throughout the 
country. But its future is precarious at best, especially in light of 
recent economic stagnation. 
 A.  2007: Continuing the Dialogue 
The legislative history of the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007, contained within the span of a year, is 
typically complex and contentious.68  The fact that a workable, 
environmentally beneficial piece of legislation was produced is 
nothing short of miraculous.  However, the noticeable absence of 
both a Production Tax Credit extension and a federal Renewable 
Portfolio Standard was at once unsurprising and terribly 
disheartening to the prospects of continued renewable energy 
investment and development. 
The House of Representatives proposed the far-reaching 
CLEAN Energy Act of 2007, one that included generous 
 
 66. Renewable Energy and Clean Air Compliance: Green Convergence, EPA 
CLEAN AIR INTERSTATE RULES MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY, June 22, 2005 (finding 
that “[t]he Global Energy Decisions study projects that with each new megawatt 
of installed wind powered capacity, efficiencies improve and costs decline”). 
 67. Nathanial Gronewold, Renewable Energy: Industry Execs Urge Congress 
to Act on “Overdue” Tax-Credit Extension, E&E NEWS PM, June 18, 2008 
(“Although there is an initial cost, the windfall that eventually comes from taxed 
income on new jobs, vendor profits and the projects themselves pumped a net 
$250 million into the Treasury last year”). 
 68. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 
Stat. 1492 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 49 U.S.C.) 
(2007). 
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provisions for both a federal RPS and renewable PTC.69  The 
Senate’s own proposal, Senate Amendment 1704,70 would have 
extended the PTC, but was ultimately blocked by congressional 
Republicans and never made it past the Senate floor.71  Once 
again, the billions of dollars in subsidies to oil and natural gas 
companies were at the root of the problem.  To pay for the PTC, 
the bill’s sponsors proposed rolling back or repealing these grossly 
excessive subsidies to such well-established industries, and to 
share this wealth with much more nascent (and arguably more 
critical to the nation’s energy future) industries.  Republican 
Congressmen—especially those traditionally favorable towards 
oil and gas industries—were in complete and unmitigated 
opposition to this proposal.72  The majority of those legislators 
recast this common sense suggestion as a unilateral attack on the 
oil and gas industries, with some arguing that the subsidy repeal 
constituted an unjustified penalty or punishment levied unfairly 
against the most patriotic of American businesses.73  
Understandably, contentious debate ensued and signaled the 
early doom of the PTC. 
The Senate then introduced its Renewable Fuels, Consumer 
Protection, and Energy Efficiency Act of 2007, which generated 
similar debate after its decision to keep the PTC provisions 
intact.74  The House responded to the aforementioned legislation 
with two additional bills, the New Direction for Energy 
Independence, National Security, and Consumer Protection Act,75 
 
 69. H.R. 6, 110th  Cong. (2007). See FRED SISSINE, THE STRATEGIC ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE RESERVE IN THE CLEAN ENERGY ACT OF 2007 (CRS 
Report for Congress) (2007) [hereinafter SISSINE, CLEAN ENERGY ACT]; 153 CONG. 
REC. S7680 (daily ed. June 14, 2007) (statements of Rep. Craig, Rep. Bingaman, 
& Rep. Domenici); 153 CONG. REC. E151 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 2007) (statement of 
Rep. Tiahrt). 
 70. S.Amdt. 1704 (Energy Tax Provisions) (2007). 
 71. See FRED SISSINE, OMNIBUS ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY 
LEGISLATION: A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF MAJOR PROVISIONS IN HOUSE-
PASSED H.R. 3221 WITH SENATE-PASSED H.R. 6 (CRS Report for Congress) (2007). 
 72. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. E151 (statement of Rep. Tiahrt); Small 
Business Energy Priorities: Hearing on H.R. 3221 Before the H. Comm. On 
Small Bus., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Lee Fuller, Vice President, 
Independent Petroleum Association of America). 
 73. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. E151. 
 74. S. 1419, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 75. H.R. 3221, 110th Cong. §§ 10001-03 (2007). 
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and the Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act of 
2007.76  The latter bill called for a less effective, one year-
extension of the PTC (expiring in 2008).77  Further debate 
produced the revised Clean Energy Act, which initiated more 
congressional bickering and faced predictably strong opposition 
from the White House.78  President Bush’s Administration 
threatened to veto any legislation sent to his office that resembled 
the revised Clean Energy Act, mostly because of the proposed 
repeal of oil and natural gas subsidies; this threat offered support 
to those congressmen advocating the same position.79  The final 
product, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, was 
left completely devoid of a federal RPS, and more importantly, 
lacked an extension of the PTC.80 
 B.  Bittersweet Victory 
The legislative travails of the 110th Congress came to 
fruition in the Energy Independence and Security Act, but at a 
heavy cost to the Production Tax Credit.  Despite the best efforts 
of dedicated, mostly Democratic Congressmen, the PTC was left 
in legislative purgatory once again, with only a few short weeks 
until its pending expiration. 
 
 76. H.R. 2776, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 77. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, H.R. 2776 RENEWABLE ENERGY AND 
ENERGY CONSERVATION TAX ACT OF 2007 (2007), http://waysandmeans. 
house.gov/media/pdf/110/2776/Markup%20Summary.pdf. See also Summary of 
H.R. 2776: Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act of 2007, 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/02776%20Summary% 20revised.pdf (last visited 
Aug.. 15, 2010); Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 2776 & H.R. 3221 
(Aug. 3, 2007). 
 78. See generally 153 CONG. REC. S15385 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2007); 153 CONG. 
REC. E2552 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2007) (statement of Rep. McCollum); 153 CONG. 
REC. E2550 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2007) (statement of Rep. Buyer); 153 CONG. REC. 
S15004 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2007) (statement of Rep. Domenici, Rep. McConnell, 
Sen. Reid); Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 6 (Dec. 6, 2007). 
 79. See 153 CONG. REC. E2582-01 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Tiahrt); 153 CONG. REC. H14260-01 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2007) (statement of Rep.  
Peterson); 153 CONG. REC. E1818 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Manzullo). 
 80. See FRED SISSINE, ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY ACT OF 2007: A 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROVISIONS (CRS Report for Congress) (2007). 
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Legislators, though, were thrilled over the consensus reached 
by Congress in effectuating this landmark piece of legislation.81  
The final product was an admirable attempt at revising America’s 
energy policy and working to reconstruct the nation’s energy 
infrastructure.  Legislators, by all accounts, expressed their 
satisfaction over the resulting Act, but many remained upset over 
the failure to include PTC provisions in addition to the RPS.82  
Recognizing this failure as the result of pure political posturing 
and special interest-petitioning, these lawmakers were regretful 
of another missed opportunity to support an unquestionably 
beneficial industry struggling to gain a foothold on the national 
energy stage; at the same time, many expressed optimism over 
the possibility of pushing the PTC extension through in 
subsequent legislation.83  Most frustrating for advocates of the 
PTC was Congress’ almost universal support for the PTC and 
generally widespread recognition of its positive impact on 
renewable energy development on a national, and ultimately 
international, scale.84  Arguably, they understood that a 
compromise could, and must, be reached and planned 
accordingly. 
When the smoke had cleared, 2007’s EISA accomplished 
nothing in terms of the PTC or RPS.  While budgetary concerns 
and funding issues were legitimate, they were not 
insurmountable hurdles.  Political motivations and special 
interest profits signaled the death knell of the PTC in 2007.  
Luckily, an altered political landscape combined with an 
intensified awareness of both environmental and global climate 
change problems has rewritten the future of PTC legislation in 
2008.  Notwithstanding these encouraging developments, the 
future of the PTC remains uncertain, an uncertainty that works 
to temper the effectiveness of the provision itself. 
 
 81. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REG. S15647 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2007) (statement of 
Rep. Feingold). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See generally 153 CONG. REC. S15421 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2007). 
 84. Id. 
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 C.  Recent Legislation 
2008 heralded a spate of energy-related bills which included 
provisions for the Production Tax Credit extension.85  None of 
these early attempts resulted in a passable bill, and the PTC was 
once again—for a short time at least—held hostage by 
uncompromising partisan politics.  For several months, questions 
about the tax credit, federal energy subsidies, and revenue offset 
provisions plagued the congressional floors.  This political tennis 
match rendered the outlook for a quick resolution to the pending 
PTC expiration very much in doubt.  The first attempt was the 
Clean Energy Tax Stimulus Act of 2008.86  This bill was moribund 
from its introduction onto the Senate floor, as the House refused 
to even recognize the tax title provisions contained therein. 
The next congressional attempt was the stillborn Renewable 
Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act.87  Congressional 
leaders, frustrated by months of futile negotiations, did not relent 
in their efforts to extend the PTC.  Nonetheless, the most 
intractable issues remained the same in this bill as in all of its 
predecessors.  A large portion of the funds for the PTC extension 
were slated to come from the closing of some “tax loopholes that 
have been lining Big Oil’s already gold-filled pockets.”88  The bill 
was prepared to eliminate Section 199 from the Internal Revenue 
Tax Code,89 a federal handout for the “domestic production 
activities” of several large integrated oil companies.  House 
Republicans offered a broad panoply of specious arguments in 
defense of those subsidies, claiming irreparable and unwarranted 
harm to domestic employment industries and a rapid increase in 
 
 85. See generally FRED SISSINE, ET AL., ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE 
ENERGY LEGISLATION IN THE 110TH CONGRESS (CRS Report for Congress) (2008). 
See also Statement of Administration Policy, S. 3044 (June 10, 2008). 
 86. Clean Energy Tax Stimulus Act of 2008, S. 2821, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 87. H.R. 5351, 110th Cong. (2008). See 154 CONG. REC. H1091-01 (daily ed. 
Feb. 27, 2008) (statement of Rep. Ryan); see also Statement of Administration 
Policy, H.R. 5351 (Feb. 26, 2008). 
 88. DANIEL WEISS & ALEXANDRA KOUGENTAKIS, CENTER FOR AMERICAN 
PROGRESS, INVESTMENTS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY, NOT LOOPHOLES FOR BIG OIL 
(2008), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/02/invest 
ments_energy.html. 
 89. I.R.C. § 199 (2006). 
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fuel prices across the board.90  The Bush Administration 
expressed similar disdain for the offset provisions, and 
threatened a presidential veto.91 Another proposed rescission 
would work to limit claims on the foreign tax credits by oil and 
gas companies.92  The PTC, which was for two cents per kilowatt-
hour through the end of 2011, was not meant to be; H.R. 5351 
was never sent to the Senate.93 
Following this failed effort, the Senate reintroduced its Clean 
Energy Tax Stimulus Act of 2008, now under the guise of H.R. 
3221,94 as a less-expensive and more streamlined version of H.R. 
5351.95  Even now, without any oil and gas revenue offsets, the 
bill failed to win bipartisan support, and the House dropped all 
energy tax provisions in its own response, the Housing Rescue 
and Foreclosure Prevention Act.96  The Senate then accepted this 
bill without the one-year tax credit extension.97 
With renewed determination not a month subsequent, the 
House passed the Energy Tax and Extenders Act,98 which again 
hoped to effectuate a one-year extension of the PTC.  The bill 
approached the controversial problem of offsets slightly 
differently.  Rather than focusing on the contentious repeals of oil 
and natural gas subsidies in the tax code, H.R. 6049 targeted two 
potential revenue streams: (1) the bill “would tax individuals on a 
current basis if such individuals receive deferred compensation 
from a tax indifferent [foreign] party” (estimated to generate 
$24.289 billion over 10 years); and (2) a delay of the 
“implementation of worldwide allocation of interest”, estimated to 
raise $29.962 billion over 10 years.99  When compared to the 
 
 90. See 154 CONG. REC. H1091-1128 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2008). 
 91. Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 5351 (Feb. 26, 2008). 
 92. See SISSINE, ET AL., supra note 85, at 7. 
 93. See id. at 6. 
 94. Clean Energy Tax Stimulus Act of 2008, S. 2821, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 95. See SISSINE, CLEAN ENERGY ACT, supra note 69, at 11. 
 96. Housing Rescue and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008, H.R. 3221, 
110th Cong. (2008). 
 97. S. 2821 § 101. 
 98. Energy Tax and Extenders Act of 2008, H.R. 6049, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 99. Committee on Ways and Means, H.R. 6049 Energy and Tax Extenders 
Act of 2008 (Summary). May 16, 2008, 11-12, available at http://waysandmeans. 
house.gov/media/pdf/110/bill.pdf. Both of these proposals looked to close 
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proposed cost of $7 billion for the renewable energy PTC, one 
would expect both sides to be relatively satisfied, considering the 
oil and gas subsidies were preserved. Still, the Senate refused to 
vote on H.R. 6049,100 and even failed to pass their own version of 
the bill, the Energy Independence and Tax Relief Act of 2008.101 
The legislative gridlock dragged on well beyond the summer 
months.102  Finally the Senate passed its version of H.R. 6049, 
perfected by Amendment 5635.103  The bill was substantially 
similar to the Energy Tax and Extenders Act, but notably did not 
fully offset the estimated costs of the proposed tax provisions.  
Yet even with only a partial offset of oil and gas subsidy repeals, 
the Office of the President again threatened a veto, reaffirming a 
pattern of the administration.104  In contrast, the House bill was 
unwavering in its demand to allocate revenues for every proposed 
tax credit, as opposed to simply letting some credits go unfunded 
(at least initially).105  The final attempt to extend the PTC came 
by way of the House’s Renewable Energy and Job Creation Tax 
Act.106  The bill proposed an extension of the credit, broadened the 
potential applicant pool to new renewable sources like tidal 
power, and would also cap the aggregate amount of tax credits to 
35% of present value of the project’s costs.107  As expected, the 
 
loopholes in the tax policy, most effectively exploited by well-compensated 
executives working for foreign commercial enterprises. 
 100. See SISSINE,, CLEAN ENERGY ACT, supra note 69, at 13. 
 101. The Energy Independence and Tax Relief Act of 2008, H.R. 6049, S. 3125, 
110th Cong. (2008). 
 102. The Senate failed to pass the Jobs, Energy, Families, and Disaster Relief 
Act of 2008, S. 3335, 110th Cong. (2008), while the House passed a parallel but 
ultimately non-functioning Comprehensive American Energy Security and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2008, H.R. 6899, 110th Cong. (2008). Both bills were 
fundamentally similar to H.R. 6049, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 103. Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, S.Amdt. 5635, 110th 
Cong. (2008). 
 104. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION 
POLICY ON S.AMDT. TO H.R. 6049—ENERGY IMPROVEMENT AND EXTENSION ACT OF 
2008 AND TAX EXTENDERS AND ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX RELIEF TAX ACT OF 
2008 (2008), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-
2/saphr6049-s.pdf. 
 105. See H.R. 6049, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 106. Renewable Energy and Job Creation Tax Act of 2008, H.R. 7060, 110th 
Cong. (2008). 
 107. Committee on Ways and Means, H.R. 7060 Renewable Energy and Job 
Creation Tax Act of 2008 (Summary). Sept. 25, 2008, 1-2, available at 
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Executive Branch warned of an impending veto.108  Despite the 
general similarities concerning the PTC provisions between the 
House and Senate version, proponents still expected the typical 
impasse, with Congress potentially tabling the legislation until 
the beginning of its next term.  Fortunately for the PTC (and 
almost no one else), the collapse of the international financial 
system inadvertently produced a valuable opportunity. 
 D.  Fallout from the Global Economic Recession 
Rather than waiting to restructure the divergent bills into a 
more palatable compromise, Congress injected several of the 
provisions (now in the form of pork) into the federal bailout 
packages.  Congress’ first version of the bailout bill did include 
PTC provisions, but did little else to address the true capital 
liquidity trap spurred by the credit crisis.109  As the nation slipped 
further into economic recession, this Economic Stimulus Act of 
2008 was ill-equipped to handle the severity of capital shortages 
throughout global financial institutions.110  Congress’ second 
attempt, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, was 
unanimously and expeditiously approved by both chambers of 
Congress.111  While ultimately designed to relieve sinking 
corporations of their “troubled assets,” the Act also included the 
Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, which 
prominently featured a one-year extension of the PTC.112  
 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/110/7060sum.pdf (the bill also 
suggested a number of different revenue provisions, including a freezing of the § 
199 oil and gas subsidy at 6%; see id. at 10-12). 
 108. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION 
POLICY ON H.R. 7060 (2008), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
legislative/sap/110-2/saphr7060-h.pdf. 
 109. Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613 (2008). 
See also Mark Sunshine, Will Paulson’s Two Plans Unplug the ‘Liquidity Trap’?, 
Economix Blog, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008; David Sanger, Spending More than 
$800 Billion Is the Easy Part, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, at A11. 
 110. Edmund L. Andrews, Recession Began Last December, Economists Say, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2008, at A1. 
 111. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 
Stat. 3765 (2008). 
 112. H.R. 6049, 110th Cong. (2008); CLEAN TECH ADVISORY, GOODWIN PROCTOR, 
CONGRESS EXTENDS AND APPROVES NEW ALTERNATIVE ENERGY TAX CREDITS 
(2008). See also Summary of The Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 
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Predictably, the Act broadened the scope of the PTC to include 
non-renewables, a ploy to entice the House Republicans to vote 
for the bailout despite the inclusion of renewable tax credits.113  
But the law did mercifully repeal more than $17 billion in tax 
subsidies to the oil and natural gas industries to pay for the tax 
incentive provisions.114 
The renewable energy industry and lawmakers alike rejoiced 
at the news of this extension, even as the national economic 
infrastructure collapsed around it.115  Yet despite its one-year 
extension, once again Congress strove for the minimum and 
incidentally retarded further renewable investment.  However, 
with the subsequent passage of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA)—the federal stimulus bill meant to 
invigorate the flailing American economy in February 2009—the 
2.1 cent per kilowatt hour PTC was extended for another three 
years, until 2012.116  The total cost of the renewables tax credit 
program is estimated to run at $13.143 billion over 10 years.117  
Understandably, the bill was met with enthusiasm from 
numerous renewable energy groups and investors.118 
 
2008, available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/20and%20Extension%20Act. 
pdf. 
 113. Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, §§ 101-05 (2008). 
 114. FRED SISSINE, CRS REPORT, RENEWABLE ENERGY: BACKGROUND AND 
ISSUES FOR THE 110TH CONGRESS 24 (2008). 
 115. Cf. Economic Stimulus Bill Disappoints Congressional, DOCUMENTS AND 
PUBLICATIONS, Feb. 9, 2009 (Sen. Grassley, frustrated with Congress’ initial 
refusal to include PTC provisions in the stimulus plan, remarked that the 
outcome was “disappointing and shortsighted because my amendment was 
about fostering the kind of entrepreneurial activity that sustains and creates 
both jobs and taxpayers, while also strengthening an environmentally friendly 
energy source for the future.” Grassley is widely recognized as “the father of the 
wind energy tax credit.”). 
 116. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. 111-5, H.R. 1, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (Div. B, §§ 1101-1102). The IRS also publishes updated inflation 
factors, adjusted figures, and reference prices for the tax credit each year. For a 
description of these figures, see BARNES & THORNBURG, LLP, IRS ISSUES ANNUAL 
INFLATION FACTOR AND REFERENCE PRICES FOR SECTION 45 PRODUCTION TAX 
CREDITS (2010), available at http://www.btlaw.com/files/ALERT%20-%20Renew 
able%20Energy_IRS%20Annual%20Inflation%20Factor%20and%20Reference%
20Prices.pdf. This figure has been adjusted for 2010 to 2.2 cents per kWh. 
 117. Congressman Sestak Votes for Urgently Needed Stimulus Plan to 
Rebuild Economic Security, STATE NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 14, 2009. 
 118. See, e.g., Press release from Vestas. 
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Clearly the Great Recession has been a mixed blessing for 
the renewables industry.  Many national governments stocked 
their stimulus programs with generous subsidies and incentives 
for the renewables industry.119  In addition to extending the PTC, 
ARRA lengthened qualification deadlines and expanded the pool 
of potential renewable applicants.120  Moreover, the Act provides 
an attractive alternative to the PTC, in that eligible taxpayers 
can elect to receive a 30% grant from the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury instead of the PTC, to cover the costs of capital 
investments.121  This provision was aimed at bolstering the 
renewable power industry, which suffered from both the loss of 
investor financing and the reduced demand for tax credits in 
general.  Indeed, the oversubscribed program “may have helped 
directly motivate more than 20% of the 10,000 MW of wind 
capacity additions in 2009.”122 
This cash grant program underscores the danger facing the 
U.S. renewables industry as a result of the recession.  Precisely 
because of the high upfront capital costs of renewable expansion, 
developers are dependent upon the availability of inexpensive 
debt leveraging that can be capitalized over the useful 
operational life of their facilities.  As liquid resources become 
scarcer and banks refuse to lend, renewables are caught in the  
 
 
 
119. See, e.g., Good Policy, and Bad, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 2009, available 
at http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TQJ 
JQRTR (noting that “[g]reen stimulus money globally adds up to around $163 
billion . . . of which more than $100 billion is being spent in America and 
China”). 
120. DSIREUSA.org, Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC), 
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=US13F (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2010). 
121. See id; Pub. L. 111-5 § 1603. Per usual, developers can also choose to 
receive the Investment Tax Credit, but may now also convert that credit into the 
30% cash grant, for facilities placed in service in both 2009 and 2010. 
122. Berkeley Lab’s Preliminary Evaluation of Recovery Act Grant Program 
Finds Positive Effects on Renewable Energy Capacity and Jobs, STATES NEWS 
SERVICE, May 11, 2010. 
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crossfire.123  Moreover, even though interest rates have been 
hovering at all-time lows, lenders are levying far higher risk 
premiums that negate the potential of cheap debt financing.124  As 
a result, global investment has plummeted, falling by 53% to 
$13.3 billion in the first quarter of 2009 alone.125  While 
investments are slowly recovering, the Obama administration 
should not hesitate to continue to explore new creative options for 
stimulating development while working to cast off the burden of 
many of its most inefficient and counterproductive subsidies.  
III.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The pervasive fragility of the economy, which has severely 
reduced capital investments, compounds this uncertainty.126  The 
fate of renewable investments is inextricably tied to the financial 
crisis, ironic in light of the fact that the PTC’s recent extension 
was precipitated by the desperate federal bailout.  At a time when 
credit lines are frozen and capital has dried up, enticing 
renewable developers and operators to invest heavily in capital-
intensive projects is an unattractive proposition.127  And at risk is 
 
123. See also The Green Slump, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 2009, available at 
http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TQJJQ
RDN  (Robert Clover, director of alternative-energy equity research at HSBC, 
notes that “some of the banks that suffered worst during the crisis—RBS, 
Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual and Fortis—were also among the biggest 
in clean-energy finance.”). 
124. NEW ENERGY FINANCE, GLOBAL TRENDS IN SUSTAINABLE ENERGY 2009 11 
(2009).  
125. Id. at 10 (as compared to the same period in 2008). 
 126. See Jenny Mandel, Renewable Energy: Hit Hard by Financial Crisis, 
Industry Seeks Help Again from Congress, GREENWIRE, Nov. 13, 2008 (PTC 
“requires developers of unprofitable projects to team with large, money-making 
businesses that can trade cash for credits to reduce their own tax liabilities. But 
in the last six months, linchpins of the tax-equity market have fallen, leaving 
renewable developers unable to claim the incentives”). 
 127. Keith Johnson, Financial Fallout: Why Renewable Energy Has the Blues, 
Environmental Capital Blog, WALL STREET J., http://blogs.wsj.com/environ 
mentalcapital/2008/10/21/financial-fallout-why-renewable-energy-has-the-blues/ 
(Oct. 21, 2008, 11:03 AM),. Johnson describes the vulnerability of renewable 
energy to credit crunches, as a majority of the cost of renewable development is 
in the form of initial capital investment; “[w]hen capital costs are huge, the cost 
of capital becomes doubly important.” Cf. Bill Chameides, Renewable Energy: A 
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the progress achieved over the last few decades, and the 
investments already made in large-scale projects.  Regardless of 
the volatility of oil prices, the fossil fuel-based industries long ago 
achieved economies of scale and remain the more cost-effective 
option for any number of projects, whether it is electricity 
generation or processed fuels.  To that end, it is more important 
than ever for the PTC to stimulate economic growth by 
generating job creation within the renewable industry (e.g. 
through wind turbine or solar panel manufacturing and 
installation). 
Guaranteeing the future of the PTC and, consequently, 
renewable energy investment, rests on developing a revenue 
stream that will not exacerbate longstanding political issues or 
agitate partisan special interests.  Nonetheless, compromise is 
critical.  The easiest way to pay for PTCs is to repeal the 
subsidies that have already been granted to pre-existing and 
well-established industries, namely petroleum, natural gas, coal, 
and nuclear.128  However, there are numerous other options that 
can help to ease the transition to a more stable PTC. 
 A.  Subsidy Repeal 
Many of the conventional energy industries have had the 
decades-long endorsement and financial backing of the federal 
government, and have achieved great economies of scale through 
years of trial and error.129  Those mistakes are much more easily 
 
Growth Industry in a Contracting Economy?, THE GREEN GROK, Oct. 22, 2008, 
http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/nicholas/insider/thegreengrok/renewable 
investment. 
 128. See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 342-43. See also Press Release, 
Energy Info. Admin., Federal Energy Subsidies (Dec. 11, 1995). 
 129. See Window on State Government, Susan Combs, Texas Comptroller of 
Public Accounts, Chapter 28, Government Financial Subsidies, http://www. 
window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/energy/subsidies/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2010) 
(noting that in 2006, oil, gas, and coal, the predominant fossil fuels exploited on 
a large scale by the U.S., received a total of 49.9% of federal taxpayer subsidies, 
whereas conventional renewables, not including nuclear or ethanol, received a 
paltry 9.9% by comparison); REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL ELECTRICITY SUBSIDIES: 
INFORMATION ON RESEARCH FUNDING, TAX EXPENDITURES, AND OTHER ACTIVITIES 
THAT SUPPORT ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION 2-5 (2007), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08102.pdf (besides having an overwhelming edge 
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absorbed when there is ample federal subsidization of costs, a 
reprieve that the renewable industry sorely lacks but desperately 
needs.  Furthermore, the technologies associated with these 
enterprises have been perfected to the point of scalability, in 
contrast to the unyielding, prohibitive costs of renewable 
developments.130  With these considerations in mind, there is no 
escaping the fact that to adequately fund the PTC, Congress must 
repeal part or all of those subsidies currently available that 
qualify, in effect, as handouts to matured industries (i.e. coal, oil, 
and nuclear).131 
In particular, there are two tax provisions for fossil fuels that 
should be the subject of extensive review.  The first is the federal 
depletion allowance offered to “mines, oil and gas wells, other 
natural deposits, and timber.”132  Recognized since 1913, “it is 
based on the theory that the extraction of minerals gradually 
exhausts the capital investment in the mineral deposit.”133  As a 
result, Congress has offered these fossil fuel producers a tax 
deduction based on that rate of mineral depletion.  There is 
further tax advantage in the fact that producers are able to 
presently deduct their depletion allowances, rather than 
capitalize them over time.  The second is the aforementioned 
domestic production activities subsidy.134  Both of these subsidies 
 
in research and development funding, fossil fuel-based electricity generation 
received the largest proportion of tax expenditures, totaling almost $13.7 billion 
over a five-year span, compared to the $2.8 billion spent on renewable tax 
expenditures); Bryan Walsh, Is Nuclear Power Viable?, TIME MAGAZINE, June 
06, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,181 
2540,00.html (noting that “the U.S. nuclear industry has received $100 billion in 
government subsidies over the past half-century”). 
 130. See, e.g., R. MARGOLIS & J. ZUBOY, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., 
NONTECHNICAL BARRIERS TO SOLAR ENERGY USE: REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE 
(2006), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy07osti/40116.pdf (listing high 
initial up-front costs as one of the most powerful barriers to renewable energy 
investment, along with inability to secure financing and insufficient government 
endorsement). 
 131. Wind Power Needs Federal Production Tax Credit Extension, THE 
OREGONIAN, Nov. 10, 2003 (discussing how “[c]oal, natural gas, and other fossil 
fuels for years have enjoyed significant tax advantages . . . [which are] 
memorialized in the tax code, with no expiration date”). 
 132. 26 U.S.C. § 611(a) (2006). 
 133. Comm’r v. Sw. Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 353 (1956). 
 134. I.R.C. § 199 (2006). 
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should henceforth be discontinued.  While this approach has 
obviously proved problematic during congressional hearings, the 
substantial expenditures avoided by the government may be used 
to offset the comparatively moderate cost of the PTC. Further, it 
is a misguided policy of inefficient economics to continue 
extending the PTC to the nuclear and coal industries.135 
Moreover, Congress would do well to reduce subsidization of 
environmentally harmful enterprises, most notably timber and 
ore mining.136  While resource mining on federal lands has 
historically been a cause of great consternation,137 U.S. Forest 
Service policies have stirred up far more controversy over the last 
thirty years.  By selling timber on protected federal lands at 
below-market prices to maintain their federal budgets, the USFS 
program costs U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars over several 
years.138  This multi-billion dollar subsidy could instead be 
directed towards renewable energy investment under the general 
auspices of a public infrastructure program.  This would 
simultaneously help pave the way for a cleaner energy future, 
and would work to soften or mitigate the deleterious 
environmental effects of logging and mining.  
 
 135. See Ben Geman, Wind Power: Industry Reports Sharp Growth, Renews 
Plea for Tax Certainty, GREENWIRE, Jan. 23, 2007 (currently the PTC is offered 
for up to 6,000 MW of new nuclear generating capacity). Under 26 U.S.C. § 45, 
refined coal producers may claim a PTC of $4.375 per ton. 
 136. See TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE, TONGASS LOGGING SUBSIDIES—COST 
TO TAXPAYERS, http://65.110.78.8/Library/Documents/upload/Factsheet-Tongass 
Subsidies-TCS.pdf. 
 137. See, e.g., MARC HUMPHRIES & CAROL H. VINCENT, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR 
CONGRESS, MINING ON FEDERAL LANDS (2001). 
 138. Native Forest Council, The Problem: Timber Sales on Public Lands, 
http://www.forestcouncil.org/learn/features/zerocut/problem.html (last visited 
Aug. 14, 2010) (discussing how “[t]he result is a public lands logging program 
that operates at a net loss of nearly $1 billion each year.” See also R. NEIL 
SAMPSON AND LESTER A. DECOSTER, IDAHO FOREST PRODUCTS COMMISSION, 
FOREST HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES (1998) (on the deleterious 1995 Salvage 
Rider provision which legitimized the USFS’s wasteful timber policies); Forest 
Advocate, Economic Case Against Logging National Forests http://tremont. 
wikispaces.com/logging (last visited Aug. 14, 2010) (criticizing how “[t]he Forest 
Service has been unable to provide data on the cost of its timber sale program 
since 1998. At that time, the agency reported a $126 million loss. An 
independent analysis found losses to be three times that amount.”). 
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Wasteful agricultural subsidies exceeding $15 billion in 2009 
alone are prime candidates for reconsideration;139 indeed, of this, 
$147.3 million went to Brazilian cotton farmers.140 From 1995-
2009, the U.S. Department of Agriculture distributed over $245 
billion to American farmers,141 with the top 10 percent of these 
(corporate) recipients receiving 74% of all farm subsidies.142 These 
subsidies are clearly distributed to a miniscule subset of farmers, 
are indifferent to environmentally damaging processes, and 
severely distort agricultural markets in a plainly ludicrous 
fashion.  The entire scheme for agricultural subsidization is 
outdated and self-defeating, and should be wholly restructured to 
allow for the funding of the PTC—a mechanism that, 
notwithstanding criticism, lays the foundation for a sustainable 
energy infrastructure well into the future. 
 B.  Infrastructure Bank 
Another potential source of revenue could be explored within 
the confines of the proposed Infrastructure Bank.143  President 
Barack H. Obama, while on the campaign trail, endorsed the idea 
of chartering a National Infrastructure Bank.  The concept was 
first proposed over a year before by Senators Christopher Dodd, 
(D-CT), and Chuck Hagel, (R-Neb), in their sponsored bill, the 
National Infrastructure Bank Act of 2007, and has been widely 
 
139. Environmental Working Group, Farm $ubsidy Database,, 
http://farm.ewg.org/region.php?fips=00000&progcode=total&yr=2009 (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2010). See also Good Policy, and Bad, supra note 119 (noting 
that America’s support for corn ethanol is equally misguided and wasteful, 
producing little in the way of substantive results while raising global food prices 
and lending a negative connotation to all carbon mitigation measures). 
140. Michael Grunwald, Why the U.S. Is Also Giving Brazilians Farm 
Subsidies, TIME MAGAZINE, Apr. 9, 2010, available at http://www.time.com/ 
time/nation/article/ 0,8599,1978963,00.html (in order to avoid potential trade 
distortions and the associated World Trade Organization violations, the US 
government must subsidize Brazilian cotton growers in order to continue 
subsidizing its own farmers). 
141. Karen Auge, Spoiled system: Eating healthier comes at a price for 
families, DENVER POST, Sept. 5, 2010, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_15996357# 
ixzz0yrIsQ17R. 
142. See Farming: Farm Subsidies, EWG.ORG, http://www.ewg.org 
/farmsubsidies (last visited Oct. 1, 2010). 
 143. Bob Herbert, Not a Moment Too Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2008, at A31. 
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supported by governors, congressional leaders, and private 
financial institutions.144  Such a national bank, featuring a 
bipartisan board of directors, would establish “a new method 
through which the Federal government can finance infrastructure 
projects of substantial regional or national significance.”145  The 
bank would foreseeably issue taxable, tax-credit bonds (with a 
ceiling of up to $60 billion) to help finance these infrastructure 
projects, some of which might very easily be large-scale regional 
renewable energy developments.146 
The Infrastructure Bank would conceivably be used to fund 
national infrastructure projects in a controlled, calculated way.147  
To that end, the bank could spur renewable development by 
offering low-interest loans to private developer partners so as to 
fund projects at a lower rate than a conventional bank might 
offer.  Further, the interest from those large-scale loans might 
then be used to subsidize the PTC available to those very same 
projects.  An environmental impact statement will be required 
under the Infrastructure Bank’s charter, and the clear benefits 
from clean energy production might weigh heavily against any 
environmental costs to be incurred (with high value placed on 
associated security, reliability, and efficiency).148 The 
Infrastructure Bank would be following its mandate to stimulate 
infrastructure projects and national development, while at the 
same time establishing a clean energy framework, stimulating 
private investment, and strengthening the fundamentals of the 
flaccid economy.149 
 
 144. National Infrastructure Bank Act of 2007, S. 1926, 110th Cong. (2007); 
Humberto Sanchez, Governors Suggest Creation of National Infrastructure 
Bank, NATIONAL JOURNAL’S CONGRESSDAILY, Dec. 2, 2008; Deutsche Bank Calls 
for U.S. ‘Green’ Infrastructure Bank, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Nov. 24, 2008. 
 145. See SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD & SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL, NATIONAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE BANK ACT OF 2007, available at http://dodd.senate.gov/multi 
media/2007/ 080107_InfrastructurePacket.pdf. 
 146. Audrey Dutton & Peter Schroeder, Infrastructure: National 
Reinvestment Bank Plan Losing Traction, Rendell Warns, THE BOND BUYER, 
Jan. 13, 2009. 
 147. See generally FELIX ROHATYN, BOLD ENDEAVORS 224-27 (2009). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Current Energy Security Challenges: Hearing Before the S. Energy 
and Natural Res. Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Eric Schwartz, 
Member, Energy Security Leadership Council). 
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President Obama has mentioned numerous times the 
country’s desperate need for an upgrade of its existing electricity 
transmission and distribution lines, and has been a vocal 
supporter of the conversion to a national “smart grid.”150  The 
latest economic stimulus plan proposed by Congress 
encouragingly includes not only more than $20 billion, part of 
which will go towards extension of the renewable energy PTC, but 
also $32 billion to fund a “smart electricity grid” to reduce energy 
waste and make long-distance transfer much more feasible on a 
national scale.151  In conjunction with a generous, permanent 
PTC, the Infrastructure Bank-funding of smart grid technology 
would exponentially benefit the renewable energy industry and 
the larger national community by expanding and upgrading 
energy markets.  The benefits of these programs—combined with 
a federal Renewable Portfolio Standard energy quota—would 
produce a synergistic effect and invite both public and private 
investments with the lure of steady profits and consistent return 
on initial capital outlay. 
 C.  Other Funding Mechanisms 
The easiest and most obvious source of cost offsetting for the 
tax expenditure would be repealing the oil, coal, and natural gas 
subsidies mentioned above.152  Besides that, there are a number of 
opportunities for defraying the costs of the program through 
other taxes and revenue-generating actions.  The federal 
government might use a portion of the proceeds generated from 
carbon auctions under a greenhouse gas cap and trade program 
(e.g. one similar to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, or 
 
 150. See, e.g., Kate Galbraith, Obama Speech Pushes Clean Energy, Green A 
Blog About Energy & the Environment ,N.Y. TIMES http://greeninc.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2009/01/08/obama-speech-pushes-clean-energy/?scp=1&sq=smart 
%20grid%20obama&st=cse (Jan. 8, 2009, 2:41 PM) (indicating that President-
elect Obama, in appraising economic prospects, favored the transition to a smart 
grid to “make the country less vulnerable to blackouts or even attacks,” in 
addition to the easily realizable cost-effectiveness of the switch). See also Kate 
Galbraith, On the Road to a Smart Grid, Green A  Blog About Energy & the 
Environment, N.Y. TIMES http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/08/on-the-
road-to-a-smart-grid/ (Dec. 8, 2008, 1:06 PM)  
 151. Stimulus plan highlights, CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, Jan. 16, 2009 at 2. 
 152. Section III.A, supra. 
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RGGI) to help defray the costs of a PTC program.153  Putting a 
predictable, fixed price on carbon is a key part of stimulating 
significant renewable development, especially during a time of 
economic recession.154  The PTC, by itself, is simply ineffective 
over the long term to spur true development of renewable 
capacity, given the ability of companies to largely externalize the 
true costs of burning fossil fuel sources.155  Pricing carbon sends a 
signal to the marketplace that investment in clean renewable 
fuels is a wise business decision and highly cost-effective over the 
life of the development.  Whether this cap and trade system is 
nationally–or regionally–based, the effect of the price signal 
should be recognizable.  
To that end, the federal government might explore the 
possibility of delegating the PTC provision to the states or 
regional entities themselves; as is, the states are often better-
situated to decide exactly which industries might derive the most 
benefit from the PTC.156  Regional agreements such as RGGI are 
proving themselves to be highly valuable in subsidizing energy 
efficiency projects, as industry polluters are forced to account for 
their negative externalities while simultaneously funding the 
next generation of renewable and energy efficiency 
technologies.157  There is no reason that these proceeds cannot be 
 
 153. New York State, Department of Environmental Conservation,, Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI): Carbon Dioxide Cap and Trade Program, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/rggi.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2010). 
154. See also Sean Casten, Prices vs. contracts: Why good CO2 policy needs 
complex financial markets, GRIST, May 25, 2010, available at http://www.grist. 
org/article/prices-v-contracts-why-good-co2-policy-needs-complex-financial-
markets/ (asserting that in addition to carbon prices, long-dated contracts for 
CO2 reduction and a sophisticated financial market of derivatives, futures, and 
other instruments are necessary for achieving substantive renewables 
investment). 
155. See Good Policy, and Bad, supra note 119 (noting that without subsidies, 
onshore wind energy “needs a carbon price of $38” to make investment in 
renewable capacity worthwhile, while that figure rises to $196 for solar cells). 
156. Currently, companies are not excluded from claiming the federal PTC 
even if they have also collected on similar state or local tax credits. See IRS, 
Rev. Rule 2006-9: Certain State Incentives Do Not Trigger a Reduction in PTCs, 
available at http://www.novoco.com/energy/resource_files/irs_guidance/rulings/ 
rr-06-09.pdf (§ 45 credit is not reduced under § 45(b)(3)). 
 157. ClimateChangeCorp Climate News for Business, Markets,  RGGI: So far, 
so good, http://www.climatec hangecorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=5757 (last 
visited Aug. 15, 2010) (discussing how “all of the 12.6 million vintage 2009 
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used to fund the PTC provision above any other similar projects.  
The Northeast states are ideally suited to implement the 
proposed setup, as electricity generated across vast swaths of 
rural areas (wind farms) and geothermal installed capacity can 
provide electricity reliably to concentrated hubs across counties 
without disrupting pre-existing infrastructure.158 
A carbon tax could work independently or complementarily to 
level the competitive playing field for more equalized renewable 
market penetration.159  “Society is best served by market 
transactions that reflect both the private and the external costs of 
producing goods and services.”160  A carbon tax would force 
greenhouse gas emitting sources to internalize their previously 
unregulated externalities, thus finally incorporating 
environmental quality degradation into the real price of power 
generation.  In coordination with a number of other efforts, many 
of which are described below, the levelized costs of coal-based 
electricity generation will more accurately reflect reality.161  
 
allowances offered by participating states . . . were sold at $3.07 each, well above 
the minimum of $1.86 set by the initiative.”). As proceeds are used for 
“consumer benefit or strategic energy purposes,” these high revenue returns are 
very good news for renewable energy and energy efficiency programs set to be 
instituted throughout the region. 
 158. Fred Pearce, As Europe Fiddles, U.S. May Take Lead on Climate Change, 
YALE ENV’T 360, Jan. 12, 2009, available at http://e360.yale.edu/content/ 
feature.msp?id=2108. Another area of energy potential, for the entire West 
Coast and beyond, is solar thermal panels—“the United States could get 90 per 
cent of its energy from covering just 10 per cent of the Nevada desert with 
mirrors.” 
 159. See generally, CRAIG HANSON & JAMES HENDRICKS, JR., TAXING CARBON TO 
FINANCE TAX REFORM-,  (2006); Energy Tax Policy, ISSUES IN SCIENCE & TECH., 
Jan. 1, 2008 (“Alternative energy subsidies that are currently in place play 
political favorites and would be unnecessary if the types of energy that 
policymakers view as undesirable were taxed at an efficient rate. With 
undesirable forms of energy more costly, the market, rather than government 
officials, would determine which alternatives are best.”). 
 160. JOEL DARMSTATDER, RESOURCE FOR THE FUTURE, THE ECONOMIC AND 
POLICY SETTING OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 7 (2003). 
 161. HOWARD GRUENSPECHT, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE ROLE OF TAX 
INCENTIVES IN ENERGY POLICY 6 (2001) (finding that “more than 90% of the 
differential reflected the imputed value of the impact of increased global 
warming from fossil fuel use, estimated at roughly $18 per ton of carbon emitted 
to the atmosphere”). 
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Academics, economists, and politicians all disagree as to the 
optimal suite of policies and incentives necessary to mitigate 
GHG emissions and foster development of renewables in the most 
efficient way possible, without unfairly distorting the free 
market.162  Ideally, a hybrid system would be enacted, with a 
carbon tax applicable to some economic sectors and a cap and 
trade system at some level covering the rest, with a range of 
specific, targeted subsidies and incentives playing a supporting 
role.  Arguably, price distortions as a result of the PTC itself do 
tend to favor one form of power production at the expense of 
traditional fossil fuels.163  One commentator appropriately noted 
that what is “done, however misguidedly, is done; a sunk cost is a 
sunk cost.  To favor windpower or biomass now would merely 
compound a historic misjudgment by adding a questionable new 
one.”164  Fears of gross market distortions are often overblown but 
certainly not without merit.165  Still others more crudely extol the 
virtues of an unimpeded free market.166  Essentially, the choices 
boil down to individual policy judgments, but it would be easy to 
rationalize the case for offering a putative advantage to 
renewables, of retroactively leveraging past mistakes to serve the 
promise of America’s future.167 
 
162. See, e.g., CAROLYN FISCHER & RICHARD NEWELL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
TECHNOLOGY POLICIES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE AND RENEWABLE ENERGY (2004) 
(arguing that a direct price for carbon, rather than subsidies or an RPS, 
provides the most efficient incentive for development of renewable technologies). 
 163. See JOEL DARMSTATDER, RESOURCE FOR THE FUTURE, THE ECONOMIC AND 
POLICY SETTING OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 7 (2003). 
164.  Id. at 8. 
165. For instance, the government of Spain enacted a feed-in tariff program 
that paid developers 44 euro cents per kWh of electricity generated by solar 
sources. After developers exploited loopholes and abused the system, the 
government scaled back their payments. Once the deadline passed, the global 
solar industry collapsed precipitously, with prices falling 30-40%. See Good 
policy, and bad, supra note 119; Angel Gonzalez & Keith Johnson, Spain’s Solar-
Power Collapse Dims Subsidy Model, WALL STREET J., Sept. 8, 2009, at A4. 
166. This approach is usually dictated by political motivations, as many of the 
same individuals and organizations that denounce the inequitable result of a 
PTC are ardent proponents of continued subsidization for conventional 
beneficiaries like fossil fuels and agriculture. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Building 
a Green Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2010, at MM34. 
 167. See GRUENSPECHT, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE ROLE OF TAX 
INCENTIVES IN ENERGY POLICY 4 (2001) (“The presence of important externalities 
[e.g. greenhouse gas and conventional pollutant emissions] creates an exception 
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 D.  Restructuring 
As far as the PTC itself, it should be extended to residential 
and commercial sectors for on-site distributive generation to 
harness the maximum benefits available.  Adopting a dual 
approach—by simultaneously restricting inclusion of non-
renewables like natural gas (proponed by some congressional 
Republicans) while broadening its scope to include non-
conventional and newly-invented renewables—would stimulate 
cutting-edge technology propagation and continue to drive 
innovation within the clean energy industry.  Once the PTC is 
broadened, additional federal policies can supplement its efficacy, 
thereby effectively enhancing its economic value to the developer.  
A federal RPS has already been suggested, and would do wonders 
to stimulate spirited investment, as the market will be 
guaranteed for the subsidized product (i.e. clean energy).  
Furthermore, the federal Tax Code might be amended to allow for 
immediate capital equipment deductions (i.e. depreciation 
deductions) for renewable capacity; by allowing this “loss” to be 
deducted initially rather than capitalized and deducted 
incrementally over time, the return gain on the investment will 
be realized at a far quicker pace.168  Capital investors are much 
more likely to take the risk when the potential payoff may be 
realized in only a few years. 
Unfortunately, there is currently no existing statutory 
legislation that would allow the IRS or EPA to simply promulgate 
regulations and thereby administratively extend the PTC 
pursuant to Congressional directive.  With that in mind, and with 
the understanding that the new Congressional session has 
become markedly more liberal in addition to much more sensitive 
to issues of energy independence, climate change, and renewable 
energy investment, the easiest way to ensure the future of the 
PTC at this point would be through new federal legislation that 
 
to the usual presumption favoring neutral tax treatment of competing 
technologies”). Presumably, the more competing fossil fuel technologies are 
forced to realize externalities, the less need there is for the PTC. The two 
strategies are complementary, and one will naturally precipitate the 
obsolescence of the other. 
 168. C.f. I.R.C. §§ 167, 263 (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 26 (2006) (difference between 
depreciation deductions and capital expenditure deductions). 
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would codify its extension over no less than a 10 year period.  
This piece of super-legislation would send a message of hope and 
dedication to environmentalists around the world, and would 
signal a truly inspired change in American foreign and domestic 
policy, from issues of public infrastructure to national security to 
true energy independence.  Under the auspices of President 
Obama, this statute will contain provisions for a federal 
Renewable Portfolio Standard mandating a renewable energy 
quota, a thirty-year extension of the Renewable Energy 
Production Tax Credit (with broad definitions to allow for new 
technologies to penetrate the markets), a cap and trade system, 
and a final repeal of wasteful, interest-laden fossil fuel subsidies.  
While certainly a stretch, the future of such legislation is now 
bright.  For the PTC, and the renewable industry at large, it 
could not come soon enough. 
 E.  Historical Precedent for Government Infrastructure 
Investment 
“Never allow a crisis to go to waste . . . [t]hey are 
opportunities to do big things,” said White House Chief of Staff 
Rahm Emanuel.169  Numerous times throughout its history, the 
federal government has laid the foundation for a strong, well-
integrated national infrastructure.  Interestingly, these massive 
public works projects coincided with periods of disruptive 
economic turmoil.  Yet through strong-willed leadership, the 
federal government forged a path to a better future.  The 
government has invested heavily and often in every layer of the 
country’s structural fabric, from transportation to energy to 
telecommunications.170  Now, whilst in the throes of a deep 
international recession, the country is forced to account for years 
of infrastructure neglect as it is faced with the necessity of 
investing heavily in smart grid and renewable energy 
 
 169. Jeff Zeleny, Obama Weighs Quick Undoing of Bush Policy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 9, 2008 at A19. 
 170. See, e.g., Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. 31 (2000); The Pacific 
Railway Acts of 1862, 12 Stat. 489 (2000); The Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation Act, 47 Stat. 5 (1932). 
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technologies.171  The ultimate fate of the Production Tax Credit 
strikes at the heart of a far greater question—will the 
government once more have the courage and foresight to invest in 
America’s energy future?  The recent British Petroleum oil spill 
in the Gulf of Mexico further underscores the pressing need—and 
the unique opportunity—to revamp our energy infrastructure and 
economic underpinnings through extensive reform and proactive 
progressive policies.172  The potential benefits include job 
growth,173 increased domestic production of renewable capital,174 
cost decreases,175 and increased investment in America’s 
infrastructure and energy future.  This is exactly the sort of 
stimulation that this recessed economy needs.176 
 
 171. See American Society of Civil Engineers, 2009 Report Card for America’s 
Infrastructure, http://www.asce.org/reportcard/2009/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2010). 
172. See N.Y. Times, Times Topics, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill (2010), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/o/oil_spills/ 
gulf_of_mexico_2010/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=oil%20spill&st=cse (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2010). 
 173. Mesa Power Places World’s Largest Single-Site Turbine Purchase Order, 
ENERGY & ECOLOGY, May 26, 2008 (noting that large wind development projects 
will raise the personal income throughout the investment areas by increasing 
lease payments to landowners, providing jobs for local workers, etc.). 
 174. Ben Geman, Wind Power: Industry Reports Sharp Growth, Renews Plea 
for Tax Certainty, GREENWIRE, Jan. 23, 2007 (U.S. is home to just “one of the top 
10 turbine makers, which is GE”). See also Thomas Friedman, Flush with 
Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2008 (noting that 35 wind turbine producers have 
emerged from China in the last 18 months, and none from the U.S.). See also 
Clean Energy: From the Margins to the Mainstream: Hearings of the S. Finance 
Comm., 109th Cong. (2007) (statement of Ryan Wiser, Scientist, Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory) (finding that “with a 10 year PTC extension, you 
might be able to increase the domestic manufacturing share significantly to 
roughly 70 percent, bringing with it jobs and local economy development 
benefits”). 
 175. See RYAN WISER, MARK BOLINGER & GALEN BARBOSE, USING THE FEDERAL 
PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT TO BUILD A DURABLE MARKET FOR WIND POWER IN THE 
UNITED STATES 6 (2007) (“savings were estimated to come, in part, from 
delinking U.S. wind turbine prices from the Euro-Dollar exchange rate and 
reducing transportation costs as local manufacturing becomes more prevalent”); 
 176. See New Energy Finance’s Zindler Discusses Prospects for Clean Energy 
Investment, E&E NEWS PM, Oct. 21, 2008. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Production Tax Credit has had more than enough time to 
prove its merit, and the results have been unequivocally positive.  
Since its inception in 1992 through its various legislative 
iterations, it has served to stimulate robust financial investment 
in a desperate sector of the American infrastructure. In 
weathering relentless partisan political attacks, the Credit has 
emerged as a vital piece of the energy puzzle moving forward, a 
trait that legislators on both sides of the aisle have come to 
recognize (if not internalize). 
Some might argue that enacting any of the above 
recommendations would constitute an unjustifiable federal 
interference with private enterprise, with no clear return on that 
investment for the benefit of the taxpayers.  Such a view is 
inherently misguided.  Issues of consumer reliability and 
environmental destruction are frequently subsumed within the 
larger concerns of national security.  Liberating the country from 
the traditional restraints associated with volatile fuel prices and 
vulnerability to aggressive supplier nations should be enough of a 
reason to motivate a permanent and emphatic shift towards 
cleaner, more reliable sources of energy.  
But to continue nurturing the economic development of the 
fragile renewable energy industry, it is imperative to extend the 
PTCs for a lengthy period of ten years or more.  The transition to 
a federal RPS will only facilitate this investment and 
development, but should be used to strengthen the effect of the 
PTCs. Extending these credits to a variety of different sources, 
from wind to geothermal, was a step in the right direction and 
should be built upon moving ahead. 
As a template for the future, Congress should expand the 
scope of the PTC to cover cutting-edge energy generation 
technology, and should include the residential and commercial 
sectors for on-site distributed generation.  The longer the 
government can guarantee economic stability in this form, the 
faster economies of scale will be achieved uniformly across the 
regions that are best able to exploit renewable resources.  The 
best hope for America’s energy future is a combination of 
incentive measures, with the Production Tax Credit headlining 
the charge. Let us hope that our leaders can muster the political 
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will necessary to break our crippling addiction, to achieve true 
energy independence in the face of a world strained by our very 
existence. 
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